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COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR  
BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE TWELFTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Tuesday, 11 November 1969, at 4.10 p.m.

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Consideration, pursuant to operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of General Assembly resolution 2467 A (XXIII) of 21 December 1968, of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, taking into account the studies and international negotiations being undertaken in the field of disarmament

Chairman:

Mr. AMERASINGHE

Ceylon

CONSIDERATION, PURSUANT TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2467 A (XXIII) OF 21 DECEMBER 1968, OF THE RESERVATION EXCLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES OF THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT (A/7741)

The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that it had been convened under operative paragraph 3 of its terms of reference in General Assembly resolution 2467 A (XXIII), in order that it might be informed of the results of the negotiations which had taken place at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee might wish to take note of the draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-soil Thereof (A/7741, annex A), and to consider the possible effect of the proposals made therein on its mandate regarding the disarmament of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. He hoped that the discussion would not be unduly detailed, as the subject of disarmament per se did not come within the Committee's terms of reference.

Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that, in resolution 2467 A (XXIII), the General Assembly had called upon the Committee to take account in its work of the studies and international negotiations being undertaken in the field of disarmament. The Committee now had an opportunity to take account of the fact that a draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-soil Thereof (A/7741, annex A) had been prepared within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Although at present the Treaty existed only in draft form, some members of the Sea-bed Committee felt that it might be useful even at the present stage to have an exchange of views on the possible consequences of the conclusion of the Treaty on the Committee's future work relating to the reservation of the sea-bed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The Soviet Union's position on the question of preventing the arms race from spreading to the sea-bed and ocean floor was that the use of that area for military purposes should be prohibited. That position had been made clear in the memorandum of the Soviet Government dated 8 July 1968 (A/7134), and it was

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(Mr. Malik, USSR)

based on several considerations. The first and most important was the growing danger that the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, might extend to the sea-bed and ocean floor. It was therefore urgently necessary without further delay to prohibit the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor. The second consideration was the Soviet Union's desire to create the most favourable conditions for the peaceful use by States of the resources of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof. In that connexion, the Soviet Union believed that the Treaty should be the first, not the last, major step toward the complete exclusion of the arms race from the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The third preambular paragraph of the draft Treaty contained a provision to that effect.

In his view, the draft Treaty was a significant achievement in the limitation of the nuclear arms race. In its present form, it took account of many of the observations and proposals made by members of the Committee on Disarmament. The changes made in the Treaty to take account of those views defined more precisely the scope of the Treaty, the arrangements for its implementation and the review procedures.

Under article I, paragraph 1, the States parties undertook not to emplant or emplace on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the sub-soil thereof beyond the maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. That prohibition, which applied to all weapons of mass destruction, was to be extended to the whole contiguous zone of any coastal State. In other words, only the coastal State itself would retain its rights in regard to activities in its own contiguous zone.

The provisions of the draft Treaty referred only to the specific purpose which it was designed to achieve. The draft therefore contained a special reservation, in article II, paragraph 2, to the effect that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State party with respect to rights or claims which such party might assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coasts, or to the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

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(Mr. Malik, USSR)

The draft Treaty would have a significant effect on the Committee's future work. First and foremost, after its conclusion, States would undoubtedly find it easier to reach agreement on the principles and rules governing activities connected with the peaceful uses of the resources of the sea-bed, inasmuch as military activities involving the use of weapons of mass destruction would be prohibited. The drafting of those principles and rules was one of the most important tasks of the Legal Sub-Committee.

Secondly, conclusion of the Treaty would facilitate the activities of States in the use for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor. At present, navigation was impeded by the presence of military bases and other military installations in the sea lanes; even greater difficulties would arise if military equipment, especially weapons of mass destruction, were also emplaced on the sea-bed. Moreover, weapons of mass destruction would be located primarily in those areas of the sea-bed which were technically most accessible - in other words, precisely in those areas where prospects for the peaceful uses of the resources of the sea-bed were most favourable. Conclusion of the Treaty would remove those dangers and create favourable prospects for the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of the resources of the sea-bed; and that, in turn, was one of the main tasks of the Economic and Technical Sub-Committee.

Thirdly, the Treaty would help to diminish the threat of pollution of the marine environment; and measures to prevent pollution were one of the main concerns of the Committee itself.

Lastly, the conclusion of the Treaty would give a new impetus to the Committee's practical work, as it would remove one major obstacle to the successful completion of the tasks entrusted to the Committee. The Committee should therefore be interested in ensuring that the Treaty was signed and brought into force as soon as possible.

Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America) said that his delegation firmly believed that the appropriate time and place for detailed consideration of the provisions of the draft Treaty was during the debate on the disarmament item in the First Committee. However, he had no objection to a preliminary discussion of

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(Mr. Phillips, United States)

the results of the Geneva negotiations, since the General Assembly in resolution 2467 A (XXIII) had called upon the Committee to take account of the studies and international negotiations being undertaken in the field of disarmament.

He believed that a treaty along the lines of the text contained in document A/7741 would, at such time as it became effective, materially assist the Committee in the discharge of its task of reserving the sea-bed and the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes, and furthering the use of the resources of the area for the benefit of mankind. He was not suggesting that the draft Treaty, together with suggested changes, constituted a reservation of any area of the sea-bed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, a Treaty which would effectively ban the emplacement of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed would be a step towards the exclusion of that area from the arms race and the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It would in fact assist in the reservation of the area exclusively for peaceful purposes by preventing certain specified types of military activity which, once started, would make the realization of that goal difficult, if not impossible.

In March 1969, his delegation had presented its views on what was meant by the principle of peaceful uses - namely, that the criterion for judging such uses was whether they were consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with other obligations of international law; and it had noted that the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, carefully delineated which specific military activities were prohibited in order to ensure that the moon and other celestial bodies would be used by all States parties to that Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.

He now wished to call the attention of representatives to the precise wording of article 4 of that text. In March 1969, also, President Nixon had instructed the United States delegation to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament to seek an agreement which, like the Antarctic and Outer Space Treaties, would prevent an arms race before it had an opportunity to start.

The United States representatives who had worked on the draft had been guided by the principle that the Treaty should facilitate in an important way the task of ensuring that the sea-bed and its resources were reserved exclusively for peaceful

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(Mr. Phillips, United States)

purposes, but that it should not and could not be more than a disarmament measure. It could not become a vehicle for resolving the many unsettled questions relating to the sea-bed and the oceans themselves. For example, it could not be used to solve questions regarding the extent of a State's territorial waters, nor could it help to establish a more precise definition of the continental shelf. The co-sponsors of the Treaty and the participants in the Geneva negotiations had focused their efforts on ensuring that the draft Treaty would not lend itself to abuse for the purpose of supporting or prejudicing any particular position with regard to those complex questions of the law of the sea. The draft was designed to be neutral on such matters. For that reason, article II, paragraph 2, contained what was termed the "disclaimer clause" - the best that the authors of the present draft had been able to devise, and one which he thought to be a fairly comprehensive statement. It would be most regrettable if any country considering the Treaty failed to accept the disclaimer clause as meaning exactly what it said. The provision would, in effect, prevent any party to the Treaty from arguing that acceptance of the Treaty or action taken under it had somehow created or implied an acceptance of new or different positions regarding the law of the sea, except for the limitations established by the Treaty with respect to weapons of mass destruction. In particular, he wished to emphasize that, although the draft Treaty referred to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in defining treaty baselines and the outer limit of the exempted coastal zone, that reference in no way implied that any party to the Treaty which was not a party to the 1958 Convention would find itself bound by that Convention.

He hoped that, as a result of the various suggestions which would be made as the draft Treaty was discussed in the First Committee, it would be possible to register significant progress in the form of a valuable arms control measure; and he was sure that the Treaty which finally emerged would assist the Committee in the discharge of its responsibilities.

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil) said that his delegation had always felt that, before any measures relating to disarmament or arms control on the sea-bed or ocean floor were endorsed by the General Assembly, they should be given thorough study by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and

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(Mr. de Araujo Castro, Brazil)

the ocean floor in accordance with paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2467 A (XXIII). Indeed, the Committee could hardly evade responsibility for such a study. Clearly, under the terms of that resolution, the Committee was intended to be a focal point for the consideration of the diverse aspects of the question of the sea-bed, including the question of its reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes. By giving two bodies parallel competence, the General Assembly had undoubtedly sought to complement the purely military-strategic approach of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with a more comprehensive approach that would relate the question of the military uses of the area to its peaceful uses, particularly the exploration and exploitation of its resources. Consequently, far from giving rise to a jurisdictional conflict, the General Assembly would be able to benefit, in matters concerning the disarmament of the sea-bed, from two reciprocally enriching approaches.

The Brazilian delegation had examined the draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-soil Thereof from the standpoint of the peaceful uses of the sea-bed. As a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Brazil had summarized its views on the control provisions of the draft Treaty in document ENDC/264 (A/7741, annex C) and had put forward some suggestions on the settlement of disputes arising from the implementation of such a treaty in document CCD/267 (*ibid.*, annex C). Unfortunately the objections raised by Brazil and other delegations regarding the recognition of the sovereign rights of coastal States on their continental shelves in connexion with the Treaty's verification procedures had not been taken into account by the United States and the Soviet Union, and his delegation had therefore formally reserved its position on the draft Treaty.

In his delegation's view, the draft Treaty was inadequate in several respects. In the course of its work, the Committee had arrived at an agreement on the need for the establishment of a régime as well as on the use of the resources for the benefit of mankind irrespective of the geographical location of States and taking into account the special interests and needs of the developing countries (A/7622, part II, para. 93). However, the draft Treaty disregarded that very significant result, preferring instead to recognize "the common interest of mankind in the

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progress of the exploration and use of the sea-bed and ocean floor for peaceful purposes", to which reference was made in the first preambular paragraph. In his delegation's view, the paragraph should have stated that the area of the sea-bed envisaged in that context was the one which was beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The progress achieved by the adoption of a General Assembly resolution should not be discarded in favour of a phrase giving an unqualified endorsement to the exploration and use of the sea-bed. The first preambular paragraph of the draft Treaty did therefore not express the consensus of the General Assembly.

Time and again the General Assembly had stressed the need to reserve the sea-bed exclusively for peaceful purposes, and indeed the sharp incompatibility between any military use of the area beyond national jurisdiction and the character of that area as the common heritage of mankind was a principle which had received the almost unanimous support of the Assembly. Nevertheless, the co-sponsors of the draft Treaty refused to commit themselves to negotiations aimed at a more comprehensive prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes and, instead of concrete commitments, the draft Treaty expressed only vague wishes made still more vague by their inclusion in the preamble.

Similarly, his delegation could not understand why the reference to the twelve-mile maritime zone, contained in article 1 of the original draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union on 18 March 1969 (A/7741, annex C, document E/NDK/240), had been replaced in the present draft by a mention of the maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. His delegation felt that the delimitation of the zone of military exemption should be stated without reference to the limits of other zones over which coastal States enjoyed rights or exercised competence. The recognition that the military uses of the sea-bed made some of the old categories of the law of the sea obsolete was an additional reason for referring to the zone of military exemption separately; by linking that zone to the maximum contiguous zone defined by the Geneva Convention, the draft Treaty gave grounds for the conclusion that the wording of article I sought to give the provisions of a Convention which had been ratified by less than one-third of the members of the

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international community, the status of legal rules binding on third parties. His delegation believed that the proper method for delimiting the maritime space concerned was to convene an international conference to settle that and other related questions of the law of the sea.

The main difficulties raised by the draft Treaty, however, concerned the verification procedures described in article III. If paragraph 1 of that article applied exclusively to the area beyond national jurisdiction - although it would naturally have to be revised later in order to harmonize it, with the future international régime - there would have been no problem; but the provisions of the paragraph also applied to the continental shelves over which coastal States enjoyed sovereign rights recognized, first, by customary international law and, secondly, by the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, particularly article 2, paragraphs 1 and 2 and article 5, paragraph 8 thereof. Those rights had been completely ignored by article III of the Treaty, which contained no mention of the continental shelf.

In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, his delegation had made a detailed analysis of the serious implications of article III on the rights of coastal States, and had submitted proposals for correcting the inadequacy of the verification procedures. In particular, it had stated that article III amounted, for all practical purposes, to an alteration and expansion of the present legal framework regulating the continental shelf, and created a contradiction between existing rights under international law and the new right conferred under the draft Treaty. His delegation had also stressed that the established rights of coastal States could not be jeopardized through an international agreement for collateral disarmament; it had argued that the control provisions of such a draft Treaty should be clearly formulated in order to prevent situations in which, under the pretext of verifying compliance, operations would be deployed that could threaten the security and sovereignty of the coastal State and its interest in the resources of the continental shelf; and it had proposed that the coastal State itself should participate in control operations on its continental shelf. Those views were set forth in document ENDC/264 (A/7741, annex C). The fact that the Brazilian reservations on article III were shared by other members of the

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(Mr. de Araujo Castro, Brazil)

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament explained why the draft Treaty had not obtained the approval of that body. In his view, the Canadian working paper submitted in document CCD/270 (A/7741, annex C), particularly paragraph 6, provided an acceptable answer to the difficulties raised by article III.

In conclusion, he hoped that the Committee would undertake a thorough and detailed appraisal of the draft Treaty in order to present to the General Assembly, when it came to examine the text, a broad spectrum of opinion among the Members of the United Nations.

Mr. PARDO (Malta) said that since he had not had time to study the draft Treaty in depth or to consult his Government, his comments would be of a purely tentative nature.

His delegation believed that the revised draft Treaty was an improvement on previous drafts, including those submitted individually by the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the specific danger to which the Treaty addressed itself was somewhat remote, since a cost-strategic benefit analysis would reveal that mobile nuclear systems were superior to fixed systems in the ocean and it was therefore probable that States with the technical capability of conducting a nuclear arms race would prefer the former.

The preamble did not lay sufficient emphasis on the concept of the reservation of the sea-bed exclusively for peaceful purposes. It might therefore be useful to insert an additional article along the lines proposed by Sweden in document CCD/271. With regard to article I, paragraph 1, the meaning of the phrase "other types of weapons of mass destruction" in the context of the marine environment should be clarified. If chemical and biological weapons were included, it was necessary to establish whether the phrase related both to those which were noxious and lethal to man and to those which were lethal to fish and plants. It should also be made clear whether the prohibited structures and other facilities mentioned in article I would include facilities for servicing nuclear submersibles for storing spare parts for their weapons or disassembled parts for nuclear weapons. With regard to article I, paragraph 2, it would be preferable to replace the word "shall" in the last line by the word "need", so as not to give the impression that coastal States might be expected to emplace nuclear installations within the contiguous zone. Article III dealt with the procedure for observation,

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(Mr. Pardo, Malta)

verification and inspection. Verification and inspection in different degrees required the participation of the coastal State in respect of activities undertaken within the limits of the continental shelf. Furthermore, in view of the opaque nature of the marine environment, access to and inspection of installations might be essential in order to ascertain their purpose. The wording of article III might also be thought to prejudice the international machinery to be decided upon by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor.

He commended the suggestions made by Canada in document CCD/270, although some refinement might be necessary. If a permanent international institution with competence over the sea-bed were established, it might be appropriate to entrust it with the functions which Canada suggested that the Secretary-General might exercise. On the other hand, his delegation had certain reservations regarding the specific suggestions put forward by Brazil in document CCD/267 as they did not sufficiently take into account the need for rapid and certain resolution of doubts relating to activities on the sea-bed. Lastly, the value of the draft Treaty would be enhanced by inclusion of a provision concerning the testing and use of nuclear devices for the purposes of scientific exploration.

Mr. CHAYET (France) said that his delegation had expressed its preliminary views on the non-militarization of the sea-bed during the Committee's third session.

The draft Treaty before the Committee did not constitute a disarmament measure since, regardless of whether the Treaty was or was not in force, the nuclear threat would continue to exist.

France had developed atomic weapons solely in order to defend itself against that threat. It would welcome any genuine disarmament measure which would eliminate the threat and the need to guard against it. In the meantime, however, it found it difficult to accept any agreement which limited the defence capacity of a State without altering the offensive capacity of potential aggressors. The provisions in the draft Treaty relating to supervision would actually give de facto advantages to the super-Powers.

Mr. KAPLAN (Canada) said that his country had been one of the first to call for the reservation of the widest possible area of the sea-bed for

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(Mr. Kaplan, Canada)

peaceful purposes, and it therefore welcomed the fact that the draft Treaty was to apply to certain areas of the continental shelf over which States had sovereign rights. His delegation also welcomed the draft Treaty as the first step towards a comprehensive arms control treaty for the sea-bed.

He shared Brazil's concern regarding the need for adequate verification procedures.

Mr. KIKHIA (Libya) wished to know whether the draft Treaty would be put to the vote during the current series of meetings or at the Committee's next session. Representatives should bear in mind that the First Committee would shortly be called upon to discuss the substance of the draft Treaty. Furthermore, in view of its terms of reference, the Sea-Bed Committee was not competent to discuss those provisions of the Treaty which related to areas within the limits of national jurisdiction, and should therefore refrain from doing so.

Mr. OULD DADDAH (Mauritania) asked whether the purpose of the Committee's present series of meetings was to prepare a report which would be annexed to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In his view, the Committee did not at the present stage have enough time to consider the draft Treaty in depth.

Mr. SPACIL (Czechoslovakia) recalled that in the First Committee his delegation had expressed the view that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor should indeed be informed of the results of the negotiations at Geneva, but that it would be out of order for the Committee to discuss the substance of the draft Treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed. He therefore felt that the Committee should confine itself to a general evaluation of the draft Treaty. Substantive suggestions made during the Committee's discussions might subsequently be incorporated in amendments to the draft Treaty when it came before the First Committee.

In order to avoid duplication, members should confine themselves to making general statements, since the substance of the matter was to be considered in the First Committee.

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Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil) said that his delegation was glad that the Committee had been convened to discuss the draft Treaty. The Committee should not evade its responsibilities, and any curtailment of the debate would therefore be undesirable.

Mr. PANYARACHUN (Thailand) was not convinced of the urgent need to hold an extraordinary series of meetings. Only those members of the Committee who had participated in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had had the opportunity to formulate their views on the draft Treaty. Furthermore, in view of the heavy work-load facing delegations during the session of the General Assembly, members might not be able to give the draft Treaty the attention it warranted. It would therefore be undesirable for the First Committee to take any final decision on the draft Treaty during the current session.

The Committee might consider recommending that the First Committee should have a preliminary discussion only on the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, bearing in mind that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor was, in operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of General Assembly resolution 2467 A (XXIII), called upon to consider the matter further.

Mr. ZEGERS (Chile) said that his delegation had supported the idea of convening the present meeting as it had felt that the Committee, under its terms of reference, was fully competent to deal with the item now before it. The draft Treaty did not relate to disarmament in the proper sense of the term, but to the prevention of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor. Consequently, the Committee would have to determine how the relevant provisions would affect the question of the reservation of the area exclusively for peaceful purposes and it would have to formulate appropriate recommendations; and it should for that purpose hold as many meetings as necessary. The First Committee could not take any final decision concerning the draft Treaty until those recommendations were before it.

Mr. KIKHIA (Libya) observed that if, in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2467 A (XXIII), the Committee was merely required to take note of international negotiations in the field of disarmament, it had done what was required of it. No further meetings were

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(Mr. El-Bahi, Libya)

needed, and the matter would be discussed in the First Committee. On the other hand, it appeared from the agenda item that the Committee was invited "to consider" the draft Treaty - a task which would take some time. Accordingly, a decision should be taken as to the exact purpose of the meetings.

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil) thought that the Committee should continue its discussions, not only to comply with its instructions but also out of courtesy to members who had not had time to express their views. He could not agree that debate on problems of international importance was an obstacle to their solution. A procedural decision at the present stage would be premature.

Mr. ENGO (Cameroon) said that the item before the Committee was one of the utmost importance, and it would therefore be inadvisable to consider it in haste. He had been interested to hear the statements by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, which might be regarded as the main architects of the draft Treaty. However, the smaller delegations had great difficulty in attending the meetings of all Committees, and they should be given an opportunity to examine the full implications of the document, in view of the bearing it might have on the establishment of the régime governing the uses of the sea-bed. In his opinion the Committee, after hearing all delegations which wished to speak at the present series of meetings, should inform the General Assembly that it had been unable to study the draft Treaty in detail and that it would pursue the matter further in 1970.

Mr. OULD DADDAH (Mauritania) noted that some delegations had not been consulted about the need for a special series of meetings. He considered that it was essential to define the purposes of the present discussion. If the aim was to study the draft Treaty in depth, it should be remembered that delegations were hard pressed by the demands of the calendar of the General Assembly. On the other hand, if the purpose of the meeting was merely to exchange information, no further action was required. In fact, it would be difficult to submit a report at the present time. Moreover, the Committee would be holding two sessions in 1970, when it would have more time to examine the draft Treaty. He felt that the draft Treaty should not be considered by the First Committee until the Sea-Bed Committee had been able to study it in depth.

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The CHAIRMAN said that the nature of the Committee's task was clear from the wording of the agenda item. There was no justification for assuming that the Committee would have nothing to report or no recommendations to make, since that would depend entirely on the course of the discussions.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.